The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires clinical trial evidence that is statistically significant at the 2.5% level when approving novel drugs, but the agency often uses regulatory discretion when interpreting these standards. Factors such as target disease severity, prevalence, and availability of existing therapies are qualitatively considered, yet no quantitative guidelines exist to incorporate such characteristics into approval decisions.
Introduction
Since its establishment in 1906, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved over 1,500 novel drugs, with total sales of approved drugs exceeding $310 billion each year (Kinch et al. 2014 , IMS Health 2016 . Despite undergoing rigorous evaluation, some FDA-approved drugs were subsequently shown to be ineffective or even harmful to patients. In September 2004, for example, the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx was withdrawn from world markets due to safety concerns over increased risks of heart attack and stroke, after more than 160,000 patients suffered adverse events and 38,000 patients died (DrugWatch 2018) . The tension between providing sick patients with potentially beneficial remedies, while protecting consumers from harmful adverse events plays a significant role in the FDA's decision-making. In this work, we develop a novel queueing model of the drug approval process, starting from development through evaluation, FDA approval or rejection, and obsolescence or market expiry. Our modeling framework can proffer insights for the FDA's approval policy, by permitting flexible approval standards based on differences in disease severity-a measure of a disease's impact on both mortality (length of life) and morbidity (quality of life) in a patient population, prevalence-the number of individuals afflicted with a disease, intensity of research and development (R&D) , and the number of alternative treatments available for a target condition. In this paper, we refer to a drug as a substance intended to diagnose, cure, treat, or prevent disease; we use this synonymously with the terms medication, therapy, compound, molecule, or drug candidate. The FDA also regulates the approval of medical devices, which we do not explicitly consider in the present study.
Current FDA policy requires pharmaceutical companies to first demonstrate that a candidate drug displays no evidence of adverse effects-known as drug safety-and second show improvement in a health outcome related to the target condition-known as drug efficacy. Safety and efficacy of candidate drugs are usually established by conducting a series of clinical trials, allowing policymakers to weigh the risk of approving an ineffective drug (type I error ) against the chance of rejecting an effective drug (type II error ), using statistical hypothesis testing. Traditionally, the probability of type I error is set to a tolerable level known as the significance level, α, and the probability of type II error is adjusted through experimental design such as changing the sample size or decreasing measurement error (Casella and Berger 2002) .
FDA guidelines for drug approval recommend a constant threshold of α = 2.5% for all diseases (FDA 2017e), which has both benefits and challenges. By prioritizing diseases equally and holding all drugs to the same efficacy standards, this policy is impartial. The choice of α = 2.5% is arbitrary, however, and no compelling rationale exists for why this specific value was selected (Sterne and Smith 2001) . By controlling only for the probability of a type I error, this policy ignores the asymmetric costs of type I and type II errors across diseases. Rejecting an effective medication for mild pain management, which has many other effective treatment options, for example, is less costly than rejecting an effective drug for Alzheimer's disease, for which few treatments currently exist. A fixed threshold ignores the nuances of clinical trial design (e.g., rate of new molecule discovery, trial duration, rate of attrition), characteristics of the target patient population (e.g., disease prevalence and severity), and the post-approval market (e.g., availability of alternative drugs).
In recognition of the limitations of a fixed threshold, the FDA has introduced programs that provide the agency with regulatory discretion to address some aspects of (i) disease prevalence, (ii) disease severity, and (iii) the duration of the drug development and approval process.
(i) One regulatory mechanism that considers disease prevalence is the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, which established tax credits and market exclusivity rights for companies creating drugs for rare diseases (FDA 2017b) . Nevertheless, substantial variation exists in the number of drugs in development, and rare illnesses are not unique in their lack of viable treatments. Each year, 1.6 million new cancer diagnoses occur in the U.S. and more than 800 cancer-related drugs were in development in [2015] [2016] ; in contrast, Alzheimer's disease newly afflicts 476,000 people, yet fewer than 80 experimental compounds were in development (PhRMA 2015b (PhRMA , 2016b . One approach to address this imbalance that we explore in this paper, is via the FDA's choice of significance level.
Raising the significance level-making approval easier-for diseases with few drugs in development increases the chance of approving a potentially harmful drug, but for patients with few treatment alternatives, the benefits of allowing more drugs to enter the market may outweigh the costs.
(ii) The FDA partially considers disease severity when making approval decisions. For example, Lotronex, a drug used to treat irritable bowel syndrome, was voluntarily withdrawn from the market in 2000 after many patients experienced severe adverse reactions. Based on positive patient feedback, however, the FDA re-approved Lotronex in 2002 with restricted use (FDA 2016a) . The FDA's consideration of disease severity is indicated in the Federal Code of Regulations, which states that "patients are generally willing to accept greater risks or side effects from products that treat life-threatening and severely-debilitating illnesses, than they would accept from products that treat less serious illnesses" and that "the benefits of the drug need to be evaluated in light of the severity of the disease being treated" (Code of Federal Regulations 2018).
(iii) The FDA introduced four incentive Priority Review programs to address the protracted timeline for drug development and approval, which typically lasts between ten and fifteen years (FDA 2015) . The Fast Track program facilitates faster trial completion and FDA review of candidate drugs that treat serious conditions and fill an unmet medical need. Accelerated Approval allows the FDA to base approval decisions for expedited drugs on surrogate endpoints believed to reasonably predict clinical benefit, but are not themselves measures of clinical benefit (e.g., a surrogate endpoint for heart disease is cholesterol level). A Breakthrough Therapy designation aims to hasten the development and review of drugs that demonstrate a significant clinical improvement over existing therapies. Finally, Priority Review requires the FDA to take action on a drug application within six months, compared to ten months under standard review. In this paper, we explore a different regulatory policy: vary the FDA's choice of significance level based on characteristics of the drug development process for each disease.
When deciding whether to approve or reject a drug, the FDA considers multiple factors, including performing a risk-benefit assessment of the drug under consideration, but these factors are weighed qualitatively, making it difficult to ascertain the relative importance of each factor (FDA 2017d) . By developing a model in which the significance level explicitly depends on characteristics of the drug development process, one can discern the quantitative effect of a given factor on the likelihood of approval. Furthermore, the FDA is often accused of fostering opaque approval policies, and a more objective approach could improve transparency.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We develop a queueing approach to analyze the drug development and approval process, accounting for characteristics such as disease severity and prevalence, R&D intensity, clinical trial duration, and the availability of alternative treatments. We model the drug development process using a series of M/M/∞ queues, and the market for approved drugs as a collection of M/M/1/1 and M/M/∞ queues. Our study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to formulate the drug approval process as a network of queues.
• We determine the optimal significance level that maximizes the societal expected net benefit, which includes the health impact of drugs on the market, as well as monetary values for the correct decision of approving effective drugs and for the incorrect decisions of approving ineffective (type I error) and rejecting effective (type II error) drugs. We interpret health impacts as the incremental gain in Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) associated with novel drugs and monetary values as the change in the market capitalization of publicly traded pharmaceutical companies following news of successful drug approval, rejection, or withdrawal. We show that the optimal significance level is higher (easier to approve) for diseases with lengthy clinical trials, high rates of attrition, and low R&D intensity.
• Using publicly available datasets encompassing all registered clinical trials and FDA drug approvals, we estimate model parameters and determine the optimal significance levels for three high-burden diseases: breast cancer, HIV, and hypertension. We test model robustness and show how the optimal significance level relates to characteristics of the development process and postapproval market. Our numeric results highlight that a one-size-fits-all significance level for drug approval is sub-optimal on a societal level, and future research on this topic should consider both pre-and post-approval drug characteristics.
• We perform a counterfactual analysis to evaluate the Fast Track program in terms of health benefits and monetary values. Using published studies on the effects of Fast Track on clinical trial duration and FDA review, we estimate parameters for a hypothetical approval process without this program. Our results indicate that, by bringing drugs to market more quickly, Fast Track increases both health benefits and societal monetary value. Furthermore, we find that Fast Track attains a level of health benefit that cannot be achieved by only changing the significance level for drug approval.
Related Literature
Drug Development and Approval. Three oft-cited sources of inefficiency in the current drug approval process are the high costs of developing candidate drugs, the high rates of attrition in the development process, and the lack of transparency in the approval process. The Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development (2014) estimates an average total cost of $802 million to $2.5 billion to develop a candidate drug and bring it to market. Between 2003 and 2011, 7 .5% of all novel drugs that initiated clinical trials ultimately gained approval, with lack of safety and efficacy accounting for over 60% of all candidate drug failures (Hay et al. 2014) . Additionally, the FDA has been criticized for fostering opaque approval policies. Downing et al. (2014) examine the strength of clinical trial evidence supporting the approval of novel drugs from 2005 to 2012. Despite the FDA's recommendation that drugs should be tested against an active comparator or placebo in two randomized, double-blind trials, more than 60% of novel drugs were approved on the basis of a single trial, 10% of trials were not randomized, 20% were not double-blind, and 12% did not employ an active comparator or placebo. While this demonstrates the agency's flexibility in considering a wide range of clinical trial evidence, it obfuscates the agency's approval criteria. These prior studies are descriptive in nature and focus on identifying issues in the current drug approval process and quantifying their financial or health burden. In contrast, our work is more prescriptive and presents an objective modeling framework that could help inform policy decisions. Surprisingly, minimal research has been conducted on analyzing the FDA's decision-making process for drug approval. One recent exception is by Montazerhodjat et al. (2017) , who use Bayesian Decision Analysis to quantify how the FDA's approval policy could depend on the burden of disease and patient preferences. The authors compute the optimal statistical significance level for the 23 most common types of cancer and argue that the traditional level of α = 2.5% is too low for rare cancers with few treatment options and short survival times, and too high for prevalent cancers with many treatment options and long survival times. The choice of significance level in their work is impacted by clinical trial duration and the frequency with which novel drugs are discovered. Our work incorporates these characteristics of the development pipeline, but also considers aspects of the post-approval market, such as substitution between drugs within the same therapeutic class and obsolescence of older therapies, effects that are ignored in Montazerhodjat et al. (2017) .
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs).
A major bottleneck in the drug approval process is the requisite sequence of clinical trials. A large body of research focuses on optimal trial design so as to shorten trial duration or minimize the number of volunteers exposed to a potentially unsafe drug. Ahuja and Birge (2016) dynamically adjust randomization probabilities of patients to treatments so that patients are treated as effectively as possible without compromising the ability to learn about treatment efficacy. Bertsimas et al. (2015) employ discrete linear optimization methods to construct treatment groups for small samples to allow for more powerful statistical inference.
Small sample clinical trial design is important for ethical reasons, but also logistically, as it is often difficult to recruit a large number of volunteers for rare disease trials. Montazerhodjat et al. (2017) explicitly incorporate the costs associated with treating patients with a potentially harmful drug and use expected cost analysis to determine the optimal sample size for a balanced two-arm RCT. Chick et al. (2018) use a Bayesian, decision-theoretic framework to design multi-arm, multi-stage trials which allow stopping and patient allocation decisions to be made dynamically, based on observations obtained up to a point in time. Other recent studies leverage existing clinical trial data to identify potentially effective novel drug combinations or patient groups to target. For example, Bertsimas et al. (2016) use machine learning to predict chemotherapy outcomes in cancer patients and suggest new combinations of drug regimens, and Gupta et al. (2018) use robust optimization to identify patient subpopulations in order to maximize the effectiveness of an intervention. In our work, we do not explicitly model clinical trial design, but rather we analyze how disease specifics drive the optimal significance level, assuming a standard balanced two-arm trial design.
New Product Development. The journey of a candidate drug from conception through research and development, testing, regulatory approval, and post-approval market penetration also relates to studies on new product development (NPD). See Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) Some studies in the NPD literature examine how time to market is affected by resource-sharing among projects in development. Adler et al. (1995) model the product development process as a queueing network, to identify bottlenecks in development and opportunities to reduce time to market for new products. Our work similarly models the stages of drug development as a sequence of queues, but we additionally capture characteristics of the post-approval process, such as obsolescence among drugs. Adler et al. (1995) take the perspective of a single firm, with the objective of maximizing profit, while we take the perspective of the social planner, with the objective of maximizing expected societal benefit.
Other NPD research focuses on the market stage of development, examining questions such as how products compete for market share. Ding and Eliashberg (2002) use dynamic programming to determine the optimal number of projects to pursue to maximize expected profit, when the final products target the same market and compete for revenue. They define the number of projects pursued by a firm as a decision variable, whereas R&D intensity is an exogenous parameter in our work. Furthermore, rather than studying market competition for revenue, we examine the role of obsolescence among FDA-approved drugs targeting the same condition.
Drug Development Overview
The current drug approval process in the U.S. consists of a series of stages, beginning with the discovery of a potential new pharmaceutical compound and ending with the FDA deciding whether to grant marketing approval to the drug. See Figure 1 for a summary and average duration of each stage (PhRMA 2015a). The creation of a new pharmaceutical drug begins with extensive research of the target disease and identification of a novel chemical compound intended to treat the illness. Promising candidates are subjected to preclinical analysis, involving laboratory (in vitro) and animal (in vivo) testing. In addition to screening for potential safety issues, the purpose of these tests is to study how the candidate drug is eventually processed by the human body (pharmacokinetics) and to determine appropriate dosing levels.
Figure 1
The FDA drug development and approval process. Clinical trials usually consist of three phases, designed to test if the candidate drug is both safe and effective in humans. Phase I involves testing the candidate drug on healthy volunteers to observe potential side effects and the drug's pharmacokinetics (how the drug is metabolized).
Preclinical
Provided that the therapy is well-tolerated by healthy volunteers, the drug can advance to Phase II, where it is administered to volunteers who suffer from the target illness. The goal is to establish drug efficacy in sick patients while continuing to monitor side effects, by comparing patients receiving the candidate drug to those treated with a placebo or standard therapy. The focus of the final stage of clinical testing, Phase III, is establishing efficacy in a large patient cohort. Additionally, researchers study how the candidate drug interacts with other medications, how different populations react to the drug, and which dosage levels are practical.
At any point during the development process, the sponsoring pharmaceutical company may choose to withdraw the drug from development. Typical reasons for halting development include the inability to demonstrate efficacy, safety concerns, pharmacokinetic issues, market competition, and financial considerations (Arrowsmith and Miller 2013) . After completing Phase III trials, the company can submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA, consisting of clinical trial results and a proposal for manufacturing and labeling the medication. The FDA performs a risk-benefit assessment using this information, including data on demonstrated efficacy and reported adverse events, and decides whether the potential benefits of the medication outweigh its risks. Companies may be asked to perform additional testing before being awarded marketing approval (FDA 2014b) .
Drugs that ultimately gain FDA approval may then be legally marketed in the U.S and benefit from patents or exclusivity rights. Patents are granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and typically expire 20 years after a sponsoring firm files a patent application, which is usually before initiating clinical trial testing, although applications can be submitted at any point during the development process. Exclusivity, or exclusive marketing rights, are granted by the FDA, with all new drugs receiving five years of exclusivity upon approval. Safety and efficacy of approved drugs continue to be monitored during post-marketing studies (Phase IV), with any adverse events caused by the medication reported to the FDA (FDA 2016b). Most approved drugs do not cause wide-scale adverse events and thus remain on the market as long as the sponsoring firm chooses to continue manufacturing them. In rare cases, drugs with harmful side effects are withdrawn from the market either by the developing firm or the FDA (FDA 2017c).
Randomized Controlled Trial Design
RCTs are the current standard for establishing efficacy of candidate drugs. For simplicity, we assume that all candidate drugs are tested using a two-arm balanced RCT, a commonly used design where patients are randomly assigned to a treatment group or a control group, which are equal in size. Individuals in the treatment arm receive the experimental regimen; those in the control arm receive standard therapy or a placebo. Before the trial commences, researchers must propose one or more endpoints-outcomes that represent direct clinical benefit-associated with the target disease that will be monitored throughout the study (Friedman et al. 2015, Jennison and Turnbull 2000) . For example, one endpoint for some oncology drugs is five-year progression-free survival.
The main criteria used by the FDA in evaluating candidate drugs are safety and efficacy. Safety is assessed by considering the number and type of adverse events experienced by trial volunteers.
Efficacy is assessed by monitoring one or more target disease endpoints, and determining whether the drug has a statistically significant impact on the endpoint (CDER and CBER 1998).
We present a standard statistical framework for modeling drug efficacy (Section 3.2) but we do not explicitly model drug safety concerns. We make this modeling choice because the number of potentially harmful side effects is large, and these effects are usually unforeseen at the trial's start (Friedman et al. 2015) . In contrast, the number of clinical endpoints used to assess efficacy is small, and these endpoints can be objectively measured and must be specified before initiating the trial. In this work, we assume that one quantitative endpoint is monitored, though in reality multiple endpoints can be used, and we assume that higher values of the endpoint are associated with better health outcomes, though a range of desirable values could exist.
A Statistical Framework for Drug Approval
Consider a two-armed balanced clinical trial with n patients in each arm. Let x 1 , . . . , x n denote independent observations of a single quantitative endpoint from patients in the treatment group, and let y 1 , . . . , y n denote independent observations from patients in the control group who receive a standard therapy. We assume that x i is drawn from a distribution with mean µ x and variance σ 2 , and y i is drawn from a distribution with mean µ y and variance σ 2 (Jennison and Turnbull 2000).
The assumption of equal variance is made for simplicity and can be easily relaxed.
The quantity δ = µ x − µ y represents the treatment effect of the candidate drug. Our analysis focuses on superiority trials, which assumes that the experimental drug has no effect or a positive effect, compared to the standard therapy. We perform the following hypothesis test, wherein a drug is deemed effective if the response of the treatment group is larger and statistically different from the response of the control group, and ineffective otherwise:
using the following Wald statistic from the observed data:
y i are the sample means, and I n = n 2σ 2 is known as the information of the sample. By the Central Limit Theorem, Z n follows a normal distribution with mean δ √ I n and variance 1. One then computes the p-value associated with the Wald statistic Z n . If the p-value is less than a threshold α, then H 0 is rejected and the drug is deemed effective. If the p-value is greater than α, then H 0 cannot be rejected, and the drug is considered ineffective.
Let the approval policy corresponding to significance level α be defined as follows: candidate drugs that complete clinical trials and undergo FDA review are approved if the p-value < α, and rejected otherwise. Let p be the prior probability that a candidate drug is actually effective (the alternative hypothesis H 1 ). Given an approval policy α and prior p, we obtain the following joint probability expressions for approved effective (AE), approved ineffective (AI), rejected effective (RE), and rejected ineffective (RI) drugs:
Here, Φ and Φ −1 are the cumulative distribution function and inverse cumulative distribution function, respectively, of the standard normal.
A Queueing Framework for the Drug Approval Process
We introduce a queueing network to model the development of candidate drugs targeting a given condition from clinical trials to post-approval (Figure 2) . A summary of model parameters is provided in Table 1 .
Queueing Network Model
We assume that candidate drugs begin clinical trials according to a Poisson process with rate λ. After FDA review, a drug is approved if the p-value associated with the clinical trial demonstrating efficacy is less than the significance level α, and is denied approval otherwise. In our model, the FDA's decision is instantaneous, though in reality the review process takes between six months and Figure 2 Queueing network representing the drug development and approval process.
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two years. This delay could be accounted for by modeling the review stage as an M/M/∞ queue, but would not substantially change our results. In steady state, the output of the FDA review stage constitutes a thinning of a Poisson process into four separate and independent Poisson processes.
Using the probabilities in (1), the arrival rates for these Poisson processes are:
After undergoing FDA review, rejected drugs depart the system, while approved drugs enter the market. Approved ineffective drugs and approved effective drugs differ with respect to how long they spend on the market. Approved ineffective drugs spend relatively little time on the market as they are likely discontinued by dissatisfied patients. Approved effective drugs typically spend decades on the market and may, eventually, become obsolete as newer drugs enter the market.
Given these differences, we model effective and ineffective FDA-approved drugs separately. Ineffective drugs are modeled using an M/M/∞ queue, where "service" represents time on the market 1/µ I before withdrawal of the product. The market for effective drugs is modeled using a collection of K parallel preemptive M/M/1/1 queues with an average service time of 1/µ E . This preemption is designed to capture the phenomenon where older drugs become obsolete as newer therapies gain approval. Drug substitution typically occurs within a pharmaceutical class, meaning there are usually a small number of drugs that account for the majority of prescriptions within a drug class.
For example, the top five high blood pressure medications (by market share) in 2016 belonged to five different drug classes (ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, calcium channel blockers, diuretics, and angiotensin receptor blockers) and collectively accounted for more than 50% of the market (Express Scripts Holding Company 2017). Due to this relatively high market concentration within a drug class, we consider the case where at most one drug within a class is on the market. Accordingly, each M/M/1/1 queue represents a therapeutic class and K captures the number of unique classes available to treat a particular disease. If a particular drug class contained two or more comparable drugs, the market share would be divided, but the net benefit to patients would remain largely unchanged. Note that within a given condition, a given drug falls into a single therapeutic class.
Upon gaining approval, effective drugs are equally likely to belong to any of the K classes, although in practice the distribution of new drugs across classes is likely non-uniform. Our model can easily be modified to incorporate this; we focus on the uniform case for simplicity.
For tractability, we focus the analysis on the system in steady state with time invariant parameters. We consider two key components of the FDA's decision to approve or reject candidate drugs:
the health impact and the monetary value of the drug. The notion that the FDA is concerned with the health impact of drugs is reflected in the agency's mission statement, which establishes the role of the FDA in protecting and advancing public health (Food and Drug Administration 2018j).
Our claim that the FDA also considers the monetary value derived from drugs is in accordance with the fact that the FDA conducts economic impact analyses of proposed regulations in which "both the incremental benefits and costs associated with increasing the stringency of regulation and the incremental foregone benefits and cost savings associated with decreasing the stringency of regulation" are estimated and compared (Food and Drug Administration 2018f).
We measure health impacts in QALYs to account for the effects of a drug on both the length and quality of life of a patient. In accordance with the notion that patient health increases when more effective treatments are available and decreases if ineffective drugs are prescribed, we associate a health benefit Q E to each effective drug on the market, and a health cost Q I to each ineffective drug.
Additionally, each time a new drug is approved or rejected, the market gains or loses value (in U.S.
dollars) according to perceived changes in the lifetime profitability of pharmaceutical companies.
Accordingly, we let C AE denote the monetary gain associated with approving an effective drug, and let C AI and C RE denote the monetary losses associated with approving ineffective (type I error) and rejecting effective (type II error) drugs, respectively. The monetary value associated with rejecting an ineffective drug is normalized to zero. To make the health impact and monetary values directly comparable, we multiply QALYs by the willingness to pay (WTP), the maximum amount that an individual would be willing to pay per QALY gained (Drummond et al. 2003 ).
The optimal approval policy α * is chosen to maximize the expected net benefit V (α):
where V (α) = Net health impact · WTP + Net monetary value .
The per drug health benefit or cost is multiplied by the expected number of effective or ineffective
we can write these terms as: Each monetary value is multiplied by the corresponding approval or rejection rate, which reflects the societal benefit (or cost) associated with a new drug. Note that this is a one time gain/loss in monetary value (e.g., the market value increase of Pfizer upon obtaining approval of Lipitor).
Model Analysis
We first examine the structure of the optimal approval policy to gain insights into how the preand post-review characteristics of a drug impact the ultimate approval decision. All proofs are presented in Appendix A.
The following result shows that the optimal significance level α * is unique and is the solution to a non-linear equation.
Theorem 1. The expected net benefit function V (α) is concave in α, and the optimal policy α * satisfies the following first order condition:
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the optimal approval policy, α * , weighs the steady-state monetary losses and health costs of approving ineffective drugs against the monetary gains (losses) and health benefits of approving (rejecting) effective drugs. Although no closed form expression for the optimal policy exists, we can analyze the comparative statics of α * using the first order condition.
Proposition 1. The optimal approval policy α * is (a) increasing in Q E , C AE , C RE , µ I , and µ AB , (b) decreasing in Q I , C AI , λ, and µ CT , (c) increasing in p and decreasing in µ E under the additional assumption that ψ E (α * ) < 1.
From Proposition 1, we see that the optimal approval policy is more stringent for diseases with many compounds in development (high λ) and short clinical trial durations (large µ CT ), and less stringent for diseases with high attrition rates (large µ AB ). Drugs with greater health benefits Q E (due to their ability to increase length or quality of life) or higher monetary rejection costs C RE (due to a type II error) have easier approval policies compared to drugs with higher monetary approval costs C AI (due to a type I error). Prolonging the average time that ineffective drugs spend on the market 1/µ I exposes patients to these drugs for longer, and thus disincentivizes approval.
As the prior probability p that drugs are effective increases, or as the average time that effective drugs spend on the market 1/µ E increases, one might expect that the optimal response is to approve more drugs. However, Proposition 1 implies that this intuition only holds under the condition that
, which says that the rate λ AE (α * )/K at which effective drugs in a given class are approved (see Figure 2 ) is less than the service rate µ E . Because we model the market for effective drugs as a collection of M/M/1/1 queues, this condition is not needed for stability; rather we see that it serves to limit the degree of crowding in the market. To understand the relationship between market crowding and non-monotonicity of the optimal policy (holding all other parameters constant), consider the following example, illustrated in Figure 3 . Consider a disease with a high rate of R&D intensityλ, and a high health benefit associated with effective drugs Q E relative to the health cost of ineffective drugs Q I . For simplicity, suppose that there is no monetary value associated with approving or rejecting drugs, i.e. C AE = C AI = C RE = 0.
We explain the non-monotonic behavior of the optimal approval policy by dividing Figure 3 into three regions which are characterized by the effectiveness probability p and the degree of crowding in the market for approved effective drugs, E[N E (α)]. In this example, let's define drugs with a low effectiveness probability (p < 0.5) as long shots, and those with high effectiveness probability (p ≥ 0.5) as safe bets. We consider the market for approved effective drugs crowded if many therapies
Region I corresponds to diseases with neglected markets and long shot drugs. As the probability of effectiveness increases, the optimal policy is to approve more drugs (despite their low effectiveness probability) because of the large health benefits of effective drugs and the paucity of drugs available to patients. In Region II, drugs are still long shots, but the market is more crowded, so the optimal policy is to approve fewer drugs as the effectiveness probability increases. This occurs because of drug obsolescence, which limits the number of drug classes available on the market, resulting in diminishing marginal health benefits of approving drugs. As the market becomes crowded, the marginal health benefits of approving effective drugs is outweighed by the marginal health costs of approving ineffective drugs; therefore, the optimal policy is to approve fewer drugs. Finally, in Region III, although the market is crowded and additional drugs have diminishing marginal health benefits, the candidate drugs are reasonably safe bets, so each new drug approval generates a positive expected net health benefit. Therefore, the optimal policy in this region is to approve more drugs as the effectiveness probability increases.
Our analysis thus far assumes a fixed number of unique drug classes K available to treat a particular disease. We next examine how varying K affects the optimal policy. One can interpret an increase in the number of drug classes K as corresponding to the approval of a first in class drug-a therapy that uses a new and unique mechanism of action for disease treatment. By treating a condition in a novel manner, first in class drugs potentially offer patients a more tolerable set of side effects or serve a patient population for whom current treatments are inadequate.
In the following proposition, let α * j denote the optimal policy when there are j drug classes on the market.
Proposition 2. The optimal approval policies satisfy
where
and
Proposition 2 states that the optimal approval policy is non-decreasing in the number of drug classes K, an intuitive result. As K increases, more opportunities exist for different therapy classes and thus the optimal policy is to ease approval standards to fill the market. While α * 0 is purely a mathematical lower bound and does not have a direct interpretation in our model, the optimal policy α multitude of therapies are available.
Changing the number of drug classes on the market affects not only the optimal policy, but also the expected net benefit from approving and rejecting drugs. In the following proposition, let V * j denote the optimal expected net benefit when there are j drug classes on the market.
Proposition 3. The optimal expected net benefit functions satisfy
, and, for all K ≥ 1 and for any α,
The first result in Proposition 3 shows that, intuitively, increasing the number of drug classes K results in higher expected net benefit due to additional health benefits generated by effective drugs on the market. We also find that when few drug classes exist (K is low), an increase in K has a larger marginal effect on expected net benefits compared to when many drug classes exist (K is high). This suggests that innovation in drug development is particularly important for diseases with a dearth of available treatments.
Numerical Study
To illustrate our queueing network model, we conduct a numerical study using publicly available drug approval data for three high-burden diseases: breast cancer, HIV, and hypertension. We compute the optimal approval policies for each disease and compare them to a traditional policy of α = 2.5%. The goals of this analysis are (i) to understand the impact of drug development parameters on the optimal policy, and (ii) to demonstrate how our model can be used to gain insights about disease-specific drug approval recommendations.
Parameter Estimation
We provide an overview of our model parameter estimation, with a detailed discussion and sources in Appendix B.
Clinical trial parameters. The pre-FDA review parameters are numerically estimated for each disease using clinical trial data from clinicaltrials.gov, historical drug approval data from Drugs@FDA, and NDA approval probabilities from Thomas et al. (2016) . We estimate the clinical trial completion rate µ CT using the mean durations of Phase I-III trials. We estimate the .
We estimate the NDA submission rateλ using the average rate of drug approval for a disease (computed using exhaustive lists of approved drugs provided in Appendix Tables C2-C4) and estimates for the NDA approval probability from Thomas et al. (2016) . The clinical trial initiation rate λ is estimated usingλ and P(Complete clinical trials).
The clinical trial information δ √ I n is estimated by assuming that the statistical power of the trial-the probability of approving a drug conditional on the drug being effective-is 90%, given a traditional statistical significance level of α = 2.5%. To estimate the probability p that a drug is effective, we select the value of p that makes the probability of approving a drug in our model equal to the NDA approval probability estimates in Thomas et al. (2016) , assuming α = 2.5%.
Number of drug classes. We identify classes of drugs that are widely recognized among health care providers. Next, we use current treatment guidelines to remove classes rendered obsolete by newer therapies. Lists of all drug classes and references are provided in Appendix Table C1 .
Monetary values. We define the monetary gains and losses C AE , C AI , and C RE as the average change in market capitalization of pharmaceutical firms in response to the approval of an effective drug, approval of an ineffective drug, and rejection of an effective drug, respectively. We use published estimates of percent abnormal market returns at the time of initial review, the time a drug is announced as approvable, the approval (or rejection) announcement day, the day after the approval announcement, and following market withdrawal (Sarkar and de Jong 2006 , Ahmed et al. 2002 . We estimate monetary values by combining these published estimates with the market capitalization of pharmaceutical companies to reflect the aggregate monetary gain or loss associated with a drug approval or rejection decision by the FDA. Note that this gain or loss is incurred once for each drug that is approved or rejected.
Health impacts. We interpret the per-drug health benefits and costs Q E and Q I as the change in QALYs associated with one additional effective or ineffective drug on the market, respectively.
We calculate Q E as the incremental per-drug per-person gain in QALYs associated with newly approved drugs, relative to the prevailing treatment option available at the time of FDA review (estimated by Chambers et al. (2017)), multiplied by the new drug's expected market size. As we were unable to obtain estimates of the market share of each class of drugs for the three diseases in the case study, we assume that all patients with a disease are equally likely to take any of the K drug classes available. Given this assumption, we estimate the market size as either the incidence (for acute diseases) or the prevalence (for chronic diseases) of the disease being treated, divided by the number of drug classes K, so that each drug has the same market share.
To calculate Q I , we assume that the total health cost Q I /µ I is proportional to the total health benefit Q E /µ E . We use the ratio C AI /C AE of the monetary losses of approving ineffective drugs to the monetary gains of approving effective drugs as our constant of proportionality, with the idea that the relative stock market reactions of approving and withdrawing a drug may also reflect the relationship between health benefits of effective and costs of ineffective drugs.
Market durations. We estimate the average time that effective drugs spend on the market 1/µ E as the sum of the times a drug spends on the market on patent 1/µ P AT and as a generic or off-patent drug 1/µ GEN . To calculate 1/µ P AT , we assume that drug companies file patents at the start of preclinical analysis (an average of 4.5 years before Phase I trials), and we subtract the time in preclinical work and clinical trials from the 20 year standard patent life (PhRMA 2015a). To calculate 1/µ GEN , we examine FDA records of drugs (novel and generic) that were discontinued for reasons not related to safety or efficacy between the years of 2015 and 2017 (FDA 2017a).
To estimate the average time that ineffective drugs spend on the market 1/µ I , we calculate the average length of time that withdrawn drugs spend on the market before being removed, for each disease considered. We note that this is likely an underestimate of the true time that ineffective drugs spend on the market due to the fact that withdrawn drugs often cause patients harm, which accelerates their removal from the market. The list of withdrawn drugs and time on the market was obtained from Drugs@FDA and is included in Appendix Table C5 .
Case Study: Breast Cancer, HIV, and Hypertension
We conduct a numerical study of three high-burden diseases, which collectively accounted for over 10% of all drugs in development in 2016 (Murray et al. 2013 , PhRMA 2016a . Parameter estimates for each disease are summarized in Table 2 Hypertension, or high blood pressure, is a chronic condition, and diagnosed individuals often take medications to control their blood pressure throughout their life. Hypertension currently affects 106 million people in the U.S. and is a precursor for heart disease, which is responsible for one in every four deaths (Hall et al. 2015 , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2017a).
Significant heterogeneity exists in the pre-FDA review timeline across the three diseases (Table   2 ). Breast cancer has the highest R&D intensity λ, but also the highest clinical trial attrition rate µ AB , resulting in an NDA intensityλ of 1.48 drugs per year. According to Arrowsmith and Miller (2013) , this high rate of attrition stems from difficulty in establishing efficacy for oncology drugs in trials with relatively short durations. In contrast, hypertension has a low R&D intensity λ of 3.85 drugs per year, but also the lowest attrition rate, leading to the highest NDA intensity of 2.34 drugs per year. The estimated probability p that a drug is effective, conditional on undergoing FDA review, is similar across the examined conditions, with all estimated values exceeding 0.90.
Substantial variation also exists in the health impact associated with drugs used to treat the three diseases. Hypertension has the highest societal per-drug health benefit Q E , while breast cancer medications have the lowest. This effect is driven by both the difference in incremental QALY gain, and the substantially larger market size for hypertension drugs. Effective hypertension drugs also spend more time on the market under patent protection due to their short clinical trial durations, compared to breast cancer drugs which require longer trials, on average. Historically, ineffective hypertension drugs spend the shortest amount of time on the market, potentially because blood pressure is more easily monitored, leading to faster public awareness of a drug's ineffectiveness. The first case of HIV in the United States was identified in 1981, which may partly explain the paucity of drug classes for this disease compared to hypertension and breast cancer, for which treatments have been in development since the 1950s (Department of Health and Human Services 2016).
Using the parameter estimates in Table 2 , we calculate the optimal approval policies α * for each disease. Our results, summarized in Table 3 , highlight the differences across diseases as well as how each policy compares to a traditional threshold of α = 2.5%. Our model suggests that a stricter approval threshold is optimal for hypertension drugs due to their high NDA intensityλ and the substantial health costs (due to high prevalence) associated with ineffective drugs gaining approval.
In contrast, the optimal threshold for HIV drugs is less stringent due to their relatively low NDA intensity, high effectiveness probability p, and relative paucity of available treatment alternatives. eventually leads to fewer QALYs because of diminishing marginal health benefits due to market crowding and drug obsolescence. In the cases of breast cancer and HIV, the optimal policy α * achieves more QALYs and a higher monetary value than a traditional policy, meaning that the optimal policy strictly dominates the traditional policy. On the other hand, the optimal policy for hypertension achieves more QALYs, but a slightly lower net monetary value. We conduct sensitivity analysis of the optimal approval policies with respect to the nominal parameter values, displayed in Table 2 . We focus on three key parameters for our analysis: the prior probability p that a drug is effective, the NDA intensityλ, and the market duration of effective drugs 1/µ E . The parameterλ was chosen because it encompasses the pre-review parameters λ, µ CT , and µ AB . We vary the market duration 1/µ E and the prior probability p to further explore the non-monotonic relationship between these parameters and the optimal policy.
We vary p from 0.5 to 0.99; this range is chosen using the reasoning that the FDA is unlikely to approve a drug if its prior belief that the drug is effective is less than 50%, and it is also unlikely that the FDA's prior is higher than 99% for any drug. We note that if the probability p is equal to 1, then the optimal policy is to approve all drugs (i.e. α = 1). We varyλ from 1 drug per year to 4 drugs per year, and 1/µ E from 5 years to 30 years.
For each parameter, and for each disease, we plot the value of the optimal policy, where the number of drug classes K = 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20, along with the lower and upper bounds α * 0 and α * ∞ on the optimal policies (denoted in the plots using K = 0 and K = ∞, respectively). In the resulting plots, shown in Figures 5 -7 , we see that the optimal approval policies are increasing in the number of drug classes K, as indicated in Proposition 2.
Sensitivity to effectiveness probability. As shown in Figure 5 , the optimal policy is increasingly sensitive to changes in the prior probability of drug effectiveness p, as p approaches 1, but is relatively insensitive for 0.5 < p < 0.8. Our estimates of the efficacy probability are 0.912 (breast cancer), 0.985 (HIV), and 0.933 (hypertension), suggesting that our optimal policies may be sensitive to changes in p, and potentially overestimate the true optimal α. Figure 5 also highlights the trade-off between the number of drug classes K and effectiveness probability p. For example, with breast cancer, an equivalent optimal policy α * is obtained if p = 0.9 and K = 10, or if p = 0.85 and K = 15. A market with many drug classes (and thus more drug diversity) can withstand a lower probability of effectiveness, to arrive at the same approval policy α * as a market with relatively fewer unique drug classes but higher effectiveness probability per drug. Sensitivity of the optimal approval policy to the prior probability p that a drug is effective. Optimal Significance Level * Prior Probability Sensitivity to NDA intensity. As suggested by Proposition 1, Figure 6 shows that the optimal approval policy α * is decreasing in the rate of NDA submissionλ. As more candidate drugs go up for FDA review, approving drugs is increasingly risky because health benefits as having diminishing marginal returns (due to obsolescence), but health costs have constant marginal returns. As the rate of NDA submission increases, the monetary losses and health costs of ineffective drugs eventually exceed the monetary gains and health benefits of effective drugs, so the optimal policy is to approve fewer drugs to avoid these potential negative outcomes. Figure 6 shows that the sensitivity of the optimal policy depends on the value of K. For small values of K, less capacity is available for additional drugs on the market, and thus for any given NDA intensityλ, it is likely that the market will be crowded (
there is little benefit in approving more drugs, and thus the NDA intensity has a minor effect on the optimal policy. In contrast, for diseases with many existing drug classes (large values of K), the optimal policy is more sensitive to the NDA intensity. When K is large, the market can support many effective drugs of different classes (e.g. ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, etc.) meaning that when the NDA intensity is low and the market is not crowded (E[N E ] << K), the optimal policy approves many drugs to fill the market. Conversely, when the NDA intensity is high and the market is crowded, the optimal policy is more conservative to avoid costs from ineffective drugs potentially gaining FDA approval.
In the case that K = ∞ (the market for effective drugs is modeled as an M/M/∞ queue), we see that the optimal policy is insensitive to the NDA intensityλ. This occurs because, when the post-approval phases are modeled as M/M/∞ queues, the NDA intensity has the same marginal effect on health impacts and monetary values. Modeling the market for effective drugs in this manner has several drawbacks. First, the fact that the optimal policy is independent of the NDA intensityλ means that this policy ignores several key characteristics of the drug development Sensitivity of the optimal approval policy to the NDA intensityλ Optimal Significance Level * NDA Intensity $ Sensitivity to market duration. Recall from Proposition 1 that the optimal policy is nonmonotonic with respect to the time spent on the market by effective drugs 1/µ E . This behavior, more evident for larger values of K in Figure 7 , can be explained by the crowding of effective drugs on the market. Recall that high rates of market crowding result in more conservative approval policies because of diminishing marginal health benefits. When the time spent on the market 1/µ E is short, the expected number of effective drugs E[N E (α)] is small relative to the market capacity K. As 1/µ E begins to increase, the market remains below capacity and the monetary gains and health benefits of approving additional drugs supersede the monetary losses and health costs, so the optimal policy makes approval easier. However, as 1/µ E continues to increase, the market becomes saturated to the point where the monetary gains and health benefits of approving drugs no longer outweigh the monetary losses and health costs, and the optimal policy approves fewer drugs.
Figure 7
Sensitivity of the optimal approval policy to the market duration of effective drugs. 
FDA Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions
Our modeling framework can also be used to examine the FDA's expedited programs for serious conditions: Accelerated Approval, Breakthrough Therapy, Fast Track, and Priority Review. These programs, whose qualifying criteria and features are summarized in Table 4 , aim to benefit patients suffering from serious conditions by reducing the time to bring new drugs to market. The Accelerated Approval program allows drugs to be approved based on surrogate endpoints (e.g, tumor size, blood pressure), which can substantially reduce the time drugs spend in clinical trials, while the Priority Review program reduces the duration of NDA review from 10 months to 6 months.
The Breakthrough Therapy and Fast Track programs are designed to expedite both the clinical trial and review stages by allowing for frequent meetings between the FDA and drug developers, and by allowing for rolling review, in which portions of an NDA can be submitted at any time.
We focus our analysis on one expedited program (Fast Track), applied to one disease (breast cancer). Fast Track is chosen because of its impact on both the clinical trial and review durations, and because the Breakthrough Therapy program (which also affects both clinical trial and review duration) was only recently introduced in 2012. Breast cancer is selected because 48% of breast cancer drugs utilize the Fast Track program, compared to 35% of HIV drugs and only 1% of hypertension drugs (Kesselheim et al. 2015) . We perform a counterfactual analysis by estimating the Table 4 Overview of FDA expedited programs.
Program Qualifying Criteria Features
Accelerated Approval A drug that treats a serious condition and provides a meaningful Approval based on an (1992) advantage over available therapies and demonstrates an effect effect on a surrogate on a surrogate endpoint likely to predict clinical benefit. endpoint.
Breakthrough Therapy A drug that treats a serious condition and that preliminary Intensive guidance on (2012) evidence indicates may demonstrate substantial improvement drug development; on a clinically significant endpoint(s) over available therapies.
Rolling review.
Fast Track A drug that treats a serious condition and nonclinical or clinical Actions to expedite (1997) data demonstrate the potential to address unmet medical need. development/review.
Priority Review A drug that treats a serious condition and, if approved, would 6-month FDA review (1992) provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness. parameters of the FDA review process in the absence of Fast Track, and comparing the monetary value and QALYs obtainable under this scenario to the current system with Fast Track.
Fast Track is designed to reduce the time spent in clinical trials and NDA review, but not to affect other aspects of the drug development and approval process (FDA 2014a). In our framework, we can model this as an increase in the clinical trial completion rate µ CT . We assume that only this parameter is affected by Fast Track, and that the per drug monetary gains and losses, health benefits and costs, market durations, and effectiveness probability are unchanged. Although Fast Track may seem like an obvious improvement, its potential downsides include approving more ineffective drugs and increasing the rate of drug obsolescence post-approval.
Let µ 0 denote the clinical trial completion rate under a system in which no drugs participate in Fast Track. Let µ 1 denote the clinical trial rate under a system in which all drugs participate in Fast Track, and let µ CT denote the clinical trial rate under the current system, where 48% of breast cancer drugs use Fast Track and 52% do not. We denote the current system as having partial Fast Track. We use the value µ CT = 0.08, which is the clinical trial completion rate for breast cancer estimated in Section 5.2. We assume that the current duration of clinical trials, The curve in Figure 8 shows the trade-off in terms of monetary value and QALYs of varying α between 0.01 and 0.10 with no Fast Track. We also indicate the monetary value and QALYs achieved under the current approval system (partial Fast Track) with a fixed policy of α = 0.025.
Compared to no Fast Track, the current system provides more monetary value and QALYs assuming We assume that Fast Track affects only the clinical trial completion rate µ CT , but this program could also result in a lower prior probability p of drug effectiveness. Shorter clinical trials mean less time to investigate interactions with other medicines or recruit different patient populations, while shorter FDA review times might mean less time to evaluate clinical trial results. Assuming a fixed α = 0.025, we find that for small changes in p, the current system continues to dominate the approval process with no Fast Track, both in terms of monetary value and QALYs. However, if p decreases to 0.86 (from p = 0.912) the current system no longer dominates in terms of monetary value, and if p decreases to 0.84 then an approval system with no Fast Track is strictly preferred.
Discussion
Our proposed queueing framework offers several insights into the FDA drug approval process, demonstrating how the pre-review process and post-approval market could influence a diseasespecific approval policy. Our model accounts for three key contributors to the shortfall of therapies available to treat some diseases: (i) low innovation in new drug formulation (i.e., a low arrival rate), (ii) lengthy clinical trials (i.e., a low service rate), and (iii) high rates of attrition in the development process (i.e., a high abandonment rate). Over the years, the FDA has introduced a variety of programs designed to address these challenges. Our model could help evaluate the impact of these programs on health benefits/costs and monetary gains/losses and, in the case of drugs that qualify for multiple programs, identify which programs offer the largest societal benefit. Disease-specific drug approval policies offer a fundamentally different way of addressing imbalances in the number of treatments available to patients. For example, the FDA's Orphan Drug Designation policy aims to mitigate the shortage of research funding allotted to rare diseases by providing incentives, such as tax credits for clinical trial testing, to companies that develop treatments for these conditions. Another way of addressing low research intensity is to ease approval standards for diseases with few drugs in the early stages of development (i.e., a low clinical trial arrival rate). By adjusting approval standards based on disease-specific characteristics, this approach has the potential to encourage pharmaceutical companies to reduce investment in diseases with many candidate drugs and instead focus development efforts on drugs that are likely to gain approval.
Our work is related to Montazerhodjat et al. (2017) , who use Bayesian Decision Analysis to find the optimal statistical significance levels for oncology drugs, and compute an optimal level of 17.6% for breast cancer drugs-seven times higher than a traditional level of 2.5%. In comparison, our model recommends a value of 4.6% for breast cancer. One driver of the discrepancy in these findings is the difference in how the post-approval market is modeled. We model ineffective drugs using an M/M/∞ queue and, in an attempt to incorporate obsolescence, we model effective drugs using a collection of K M/M/1/1 queues, which results in diminishing marginal health benefits.
As a result, our model places more weight on the costs of drug approval and thus recommends stricter approval standards. While our work accounts for obsolescence among drugs on the market, Montazerhodjat et al. (2017) ignore these effects and model effective and ineffective drugs in the same manner, which result in easier less stringent approval policies.
We focus our analysis on drug approval in the U.S., but our framework can be modified to model drug approval in other regions. Drugs developed in the U.S. and Europe both undergo clinical trial testing, but the review and approval processes differ substantially. In the U.S., all drugs undergo centralized review by the FDA, whereas in Europe, there are four possible paths to drug approval: a centralized process overseen by the European Medicines Agency, application to the regulatory body of a single European Union (EU) state, application for approval in all EU states following approval in one state, and independent application in multiple EU states (Van Norman 2016) . A queueing framework such as the one presented in this work could be used to analyze the benefits of different approval pathways and to compare the European and American systems.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, drug efficacy is based on a single quantitative endpoint resulting from a balanced, two-arm randomized clinical trial. Modern trial designs are often unbalanced, have more than two arms, and involve multiple endpoints. Our model could be easily adapted for unbalanced trials, but incorporating multiple arms and endpoints would require a more sophisticated hypothesis testing framework and queueing model. With breast cancer, for example, potential clinical endpoints include the tumor size and time until recurrence, and it is unclear how these endpoints should be collectively used to establish drug efficacy. However, such disease-specific complexity could render our model analytically intractable.
Second, we make several simplifying assumptions regarding the FDA's decision making process.
We do not consider qualitative aspects, such as concerns over clinical trial design nor labeling or manufacturing capabilities, as possible reasons for denying approval. We also do not consider that the FDA may request that a firm revise and resubmit an NDA, which occurs in about 30% of reviews (Downing et al. 2014) . Additionally, we assume that the NDA filing and FDA review stage occur immediately; in reality, these reviews take six to ten months, on average. Our model could be extended to incorporate such complexities, but would not likely change our main insight regarding the suboptimality of a one-size-fits-all approval policy.
We make several assumptions when computing the expected net benefit. We assume that all queues are in steady state and the number of drug classes K is fixed, rather than using a transient analysis and allowing K to vary with time. The assumption that a queueing system is in steady state is commonly used because transient analysis is often intractable. We aim to capture obsolescence and substitution by limiting the number of unique drug classes in the market, but a variety of other measures could be used; for example, one could consider the number of drugs that exceed a given market share (e.g., 10%) for a disease.
Future Work
Our study motivates several directions for future work. Currently, we model drug effectiveness as a binary variable, where drugs are either effective or ineffective, and we model drugs as having the same health impacts and monetary values in expectation. One extension is to model effectiveness as a continuous (or random) variable and/or model the health impacts and monetary values as random variables in order to account for heterogeneous responses of patients to a given treatment.
Another extension would be to analyze the drug development process using a game theoretic approach, with the FDA and a pharmaceutical company as players. Conditions under which a pharmaceutical company should conduct additional clinical trials and resubmit a rejected NDA, or when they should abandon the failed drug and begin developing a new product, could be explored.
Conclusions
Faced with regulating thousands of drugs in a nation where millions are afflicted with severe diseases and advances in medical treatment have improved the quality and length of life, the FDA must find the correct balance between ensuring the safety and effectiveness of drugs while spurring development of novel therapeutics and bringing life-saving products to market in a timely fashion.
Our work offers a transparent, quantitative framework that can be used to assess candidate drugs based on severity and prevalence as well as characteristics of the drug development process and existing market. Such a model could augment the complex decision-making and statistical analyses conducted by the FDA, providing a more customized approach to policy-making. 
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Appendix A: Proofs
We suppress the dependence of various terms on α for readability and only explicitly note it when needed for clarity. For all derivatives, the variable of differentiation is α unless otherwise specified. Proof of Theorem 1: To show that V (α) is concave in α, we argue that
, and −C RE λ RE (α) are all concave functions of α, and thus the sum of concave functions is concave. Direct computation shows that E[N E (α)] is concave increasing in ψ E (α) and that ψ E (α) is concave in α. Thus E[N E (α)] is concave. Establishing concavity of the remaining terms is similarly straightforward. We note that in the case that α > 0, −C AI ψ AI (α) and −C RE λ RE (α) are strictly concave in α and thus so is V (α).
Proof of Proposition 1: By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have that
where x is the parameter of interest. The fact that V (α) is concave in α means the denominator is negative and thus the sign of ∂α * ∂x is given by the sign of
. We use the equation
∂α to find the sign of the effect of each parameter on α * :
∂α∂λ Multiplying both sides byλ > 0 (which does not change the sign) gives
The second equality is due to the first order condition for α * . The sign of the last expression is negative due to the concavity of E[N E ] with respect to ψ E and the fact that ψ E is increasing in α.
We claim that ≥ 0. The proof of this is given by straightforward differentiation:
The condition ψ E (α * ) < 1 is sufficient to guarantee that 
From the optimality of α * K+1 , we know that V K+1 (α * K+1 ) = 0, and thus noting that (A.22) is negative gives V K (α * K+1 ) ≤ 0. As this holds for any K, we obtain the desired result. Consider a system in which K = 0. Applying the same argument as above gives
Noting that this expression is negative and that V 0 is concave in α, we see that
where α * 0 is found by solving V 0 (α) = 0. Next, consider a system in which K = ∞. We demonstrate that α *
Kµ E +λ AE , and thus taking the limit of this expression as K goes to infinity gives E[N
. Once again, we use the concavity of V K (α) to establish the result. Consider the following expression:
By the optimality of α * ∞ , we have that V ∞ (α * ∞ ) = 0, and thus V K (α * ∞ ) ≤ 0. As a result, we have
where α * ∞ can be found by solving V ∞ (α) = 0. Proof of Proposition 3: We begin by demonstrating that
The following calculation shows that this is the case:
The series of inequalities
To do this, we first show that V K (α) ≤ V ∞ (α) for all α as follows:
The remainder of the proof follows from the series of inequalities
Appendix B: Exponential Assumptions
In order to test the assumption that the duration of clinical trials is exponentially distributed, we downloaded 10,000 (the maximum permitted) phase I, phase II, and phase III clinical trial records from clinicaltrials.gov with trial start dates from January 2000 to September 2018 (clinical trial registration was not required before 2000). To ensure that we had a large enough sample size for our analysis, we examined data for trials targeting any condition rather than limiting ourselves to the three diseases studied in the paper. Using maximum likelihood estimation, we estimate exponential distribution parameters for each phase of clinical trials. Figure B1 shows histograms and qqplots of the duration of trials in each phase of clinical trials. Note that the curve shown in each histogram is the density of the estimated exponential distribution. Figure B1 shows that the distribution of clinical trial durations in each phase is unimodal and right skewed. Examining the qqplots, we see that our data fits an exponential distribution well for trials with short durations, but the data has some trials with longer durations than predicted. For phase I, these are trials that last more than 3 years, while for phase III, these are trials whose durations exceed 6 years. However, as these trials constitute 4.6% and 1.6% of the phase I and phase III data, respectively, we believe that the exponential distribution is a reasonable model for clinical trial duration. Histogram Phase III Trial DurationsQQPlot Phase I Trial DurationsQQPlot Phase II Trial Durations• Rate of abandonment. Recall that the probability of a drug completing clinical trials is given by P(complete clinical trials) = µ CT µ CT + µ AB (C.34)
For each drug intervention in our data, we define a binary variable Completed Phase III to be one if there is a Phase III or Phase IV trial associated with that intervention, and zero otherwise. Our estimate of the probability of completing clinical trials is the mean of Completed Phase III. Given our estimates of µ CT and P(complete clinical trials), we use equation C.34 to solve for our estimate of µ AB .
• Rate of clinical trial initiation and NDA submission. In order to estimate the NDA submission rate λ and clinical trial initiation rateλ, we first note that the rate λ AE + λ AI at which drugs are approved is the product of the rate at which NDAs are submittedλ and the probability that a submitted NDA is approved, P(Approve NDA). We estimate the average rate λ AE + λ AI at which drugs were historically approved using exhaustive lists of drugs approved to treat a disease (Tables C2 -C4) , and we use estimates for P(Approve NDA) from Thomas et al. (2016) . Using our estimates of λ AE + λ AI and P(Approve NDA), we obtain our estimate ofλ asλ = (λ AE + λ AI )/P(Approve NDA). The rate at which drugs begin clinical trials λ is then estimated as λ =λ/P(Complete clinical trials).
• Clinical trial information. The clinical trial information δ √ I n is estimated by assuming the statistical power of the trial-the probability of approving a drug conditional on the drug being effective (given by π AE /p)-is 90%, given a traditional statistical significance level of α = 2.5%. Mathematically, our estimate δ √ I n is chosen to satisfy .90 = 1 − Φ Φ −1 (1 − 0.025) − δ √ I n .
• Effectiveness probability. To estimate the prior probability p that a drug is effective, we select the value of p that makes the probability of approving a drug in our model equal to the estimated probability that an NDA is approved, assuming α = 2.5%. Thus our estimate p satisfies P(Approve NDA) = π AE (α)+π AI (α) = 1 − Φ Φ −1 (1 − 0.025) − δ √ I n p + (1 − 0.025)p. Monetary Values. To estimate C AE , C AI , and C RE , we multiply the median pharmaceutical market capitalization M arket Cap by the percent change in market capitalization as a result of approving effective, approving ineffective, and rejecting effective drugs, respectively. We use published estimates from Sarkar and de Jong (2006) and Ahmed et al. (2002) of percent abnormal market returns at the time of initial review r initial , the time a drug is announced as approvable r approvable , the approval announcement day r approval day (or the rejection announcement day r rejection ), the day after the approval announcement r day af ter approval , and following market withdrawal r withdrawal . We combine these values with the median pharmaceutical market capitalization to obtain the following monetary value estimates:
C AE = (r initial + r approvable + r approval day + r day af ter approval ) · M arket Cap (C.35)
C AI = C AE − (r withdrawal ) · M arket Cap (C.36)
C RE = (r initial + r approvable − r rejection ) · M arket Cap · p.
(C.37)
Note that the probability p that a drug is effective appears in our estimate for C RE , but not in our estimates for C AE or C AI . In the case of approved drugs, we assume that it is possible to distinguish the monetary value of effective and ineffective drugs using the market reaction to drug withdrawals. In the case of rejected drugs this differentiation is not possible, so instead we multiply the change in market capitalization by the probability that a drug is effective. Anastrozole ( Table C4 FDA-approved hypertension drugs.
